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It is an unalterable fact that our judicial system, like the human be-
ings who administer it, is fallible. But history is replete with exam-
ples of wrongly convicted persons who have been pardoned in the
wake of after-discovered evidence establishing their innocence.'
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1. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 868 (1993).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The death penalty never fails to ignite heated debates, not only
about its moral acceptability, but also about whether it is enforced
quickly enough to achieve its purpose of teaching criminals a les-
son. The death penalty is unquestionably the most extreme form
of punishment that society inflicts upon a human being for the
commission of a crime. While the trend in other areas of the world
is toward abolition of the death penalty,3 public opinion in the
United States clearly favors capital punishment.4
Texans favor executions as much as, or perhaps more than, their
compatriots,5 which is evidenced by the number of people on death
row in Texas. 6 Public support of the death penalty is not lost on the
politicians who unabashedly campaign for capital punishment as a
2. See Symposium, Are Executions in New York Inevitable?, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
557 passim (1995) (reporting panel debate over morality and effectiveness of death sen-
tence); see also Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 194, 201 n.4 (7th Cir. 1985)
(stating that teaching criminals lesson is one justification for punishing criminals); Wichita
v. Lucero, 874 P.2d 1144, 1149 (Kan. 1994) (asserting that severe punishment under recidi-
vist statute should serve as lesson to repeat offenders and cause offenders to reform); Lisa
A. Smith, The Moral Reform Theory of Punishment, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 197, 199 (1995)
(explaining how moral education theory views punishment as way to teach deviants to
avoid wrongful behavior).
3. See Michael Hamlyn, Death Sentence Is Abolished by South Africa, RUETERS INFO.
SERVS., June 7, 1995 (noting that Constitutional Court of South Africa recently invalidated
capital punishment), available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS Database.
4. See Mark Clements, Parade's National Survey on Law and Order, PARADE, Apr.
18, 1993, at 4 (finding that 87% of 2,512 people randomly surveyed in country supported
capital punishment); see also Death Row U.S.A., NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUC.
FUND (Capital Punishment Project, New York, N.Y.), Summer 1994, at 1 (stating that as of
July 20, 1994, there were 2,870 inmates on death row in United States).
5. See Shelly Clarke, Note, A Reasoned Moral Response: Rethinking Texas' Capital
Sentencing Statute After Penry v. Lynaugh, 69 TEX. L. REV. 407, 408 (1990) (noting that no
other state exceeds Texas in number of executions); Sam H. Verhovek, Texas Opens Door
for Death-Row Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1994, at A12 (finding that Texas has exe-
cuted nearly one-third of all inmates put to death in United States since Supreme Court
reinstated death penalty in 1976).
6. As of September 11, 1995, 406 persons were on death row in Texas. Memorandum
from Texas Department of Criminal Justice (Sept. 11, 1995) (on file with the St. Mary's
Law Journal). In addition, 98 persons have been executed in Texas since the death penalty
was reinstated in 1976. Telephone Interview with David Nunnelee, Public Information
Officer, Texas Department of Criminal Justice (Sept. 11, 1995); see also KELLIE
DWORACZYK, AFTER THE DEATH SENTENCE: APPEALS, CLEMENCY AND REPRESENTA-
TION, SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE REPORT 11 (Apr. 4, 1994) (House Research Organization)(stating that inmates average 8.2 years on death row before execution).
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remedy for crime.7 Yet, virtually every study on the matter shows
that the death penalty has no deterrent value,8 and that it is an
expensive judicial process as a result of the built-in constitutional
safeguards. 9
The public is divided on the issue of whether the appeals process
in death penalty cases should be curtailed. Some argue that cur-
tailing death-row inmates' appeals would expedite executions, save
the taxpayers money, and provide swifter justice. 10 On the other
hand, many people, including those who firmly believe in capital
punishment, agree that the current safeguards are necessary to pre-
vent the tragedy of executing innocent persons." This fear that
innocent persons may be executed is not unfounded. Many states
have come perilously close to executing persons convicted of
crimes that they did not commit,' 2 and Texas is no exception. 3
7. See William Murchison, We All Want Habeas Reform, TEX. LAW., Apr. 24, 1995, at
19 (observing that "[in the No-Nonsense 'Nineties, Congress and the Texas Legislature
alike are moving swiftly to make possible the swifter execution of murderers").
8. See Robert M. Morgenthau, What Prosecutors Won't Tell You, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,
1995, at A25 (conceding that 100 years of experience produced no credible evidence to
show that executions deter crime).
9. See Christy Hoppe, Executions Cost Texas Millions, Study Finds It's Cheaper to Jail
Killers for Life, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 8, 1992, at Al (discussing study by Dallas
Morning News, which found that death penalty cases cost average of $2.3 million per case,
about three times cost of imprisoning someone in single cell at highest security level for 40
years); Sam H. Verhovek, Across the U.S., Executions Are Neither Swift Nor Cheap, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1995, at Al (noting that death penalty cases take longer and cost more, and
concluding that lengthy appeals are inevitable because of constitutional standards).
10. See American Survey: The Waiting Game, ECONOMIST, Apr. 1, 1995, at A19 (not-
ing that some people believe that answer to costly death-row appeals is streamlining ap-
peals process); cf James Cullen, The Session at Midpoint, TEX. OBSERVER, Apr. 7, 1995, at
4 (recognizing that goal of Texas's new habeas law is to "execute people as quickly as
possible").
11. See Samuel J.M. Donnelly, Capital Punishment: A Critique of the Political and
Philosophical Thought Supporting the Justices' Position, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 76-77 (1992)
(discussing ad hoc committee study of federal habeas corpus reform, which found that
although public opinion overwhelmingly supports death penalty, safeguards must be in
place to ensure its reliability and fairness because death is irreversible).
12. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 103d CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT
ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 3 (Comm. Print 1994) (reporting that since 1973, 52 people have
been released from death row after discovering evidence of their innocence).
13. See James Cullen, The Session at Midpoint, TEX. OBSERVER, Apr. 7, 1995, at 4
(referring to statistics of United States Department of Justice, which indicate that nearly
25% of all death penalty convictions in Texas between 1973 and 1993 were overturned in
whole or in part, and at least seven convicted death-row inmates were released during that
period).
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While it is impossible to know the true number of innocent persons
who have been executed, history shows that these tragedies occur
more than we care to admit.'4 Executing the innocent contradicts
the very reason a democracy exists-to foster individual liberty.15
The 74th Texas Legislature addressed this tension between facili-
tating executions and assuring meaningful protection against
wrongful executions. At the strong urging of the governor and the
attorney general, and as a result of the persistent lobby of the
state's prosecutors, Texas lawmakers decided to dramatically revise
and limit Texas's habeas corpus protection for individuals sen-
tenced to death.' 6 The Texas Legislature created a special habeas
corpus law for capital punishment cases and amended the prior
habeas corpus statute for other cases. 17 The law that emerged, Ar-
ticle 11.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,' 8 runs the
14. See MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE 282-356 (1992)
(describing 23 cases since 1900 in which innocent people, wrongly convicted of murder or
rape, were executed); cf. KELLIE DwORAcz C, AFTER THE DEATH SENTENCE: APPEALS,
CLEMENCY AND REPRESENTATION, SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE REPORT 14 (Apr. 4, 1994)
(House Research Organization) (discussing study by Columbia University Law School
Professor James Liebman, which concluded that approximately 40% of all death sentences
that were appealed on procedural or constitutional grounds were reversed).
15. See Keegan v. Lawrence, 778 F. Supp. 523, 525 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (recognizing tanta-
mount importance of individual liberty in constitutional democracy); see also Henderson v.
Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878, 904 (Ala. 1993) (Houston, J., dissenting) (stating that
King John sealed Magna Carta, "thereby creating or preserving two concepts of govern-
ance that protect individual liberty: representative democracy and trial by jury"); M.
Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying Interna-
tional Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DuKE
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235, 253 (1993) (asserting that without respect for fundamental rights,
criminal process will abridge individual liberties and ultimately destroy democracy); cf.
Asherman v. Meachum, 932 F.2d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1991) (describing writ of habeas corpus
in democratic system as "ancient buttress for individual liberty").
16. See William Murchison, We All Want Habeas Reform, TEX. LAW., Apr. 24, 1995, at
19 (reporting that Texas habeas reform bill was expected to pass promptly, and that Texas
Governor George Bush was "ready to sign" habeas bill).
17. See Act of May 24, 1995, S.B. 440, § 1, 74th Leg., R.S. (to be codified at TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071) (establishing procedures for habeas relief in death
penalty cases); Act of May 24, 1995, S.B. 440, § 5, 74th Leg., R.S. (to be codified at TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07) (amending procedures for habeas corpus applicants in
noncapital cases). Prior to the enactment of Article 11.071, all persons convicted of a fel-
ony, regardless of the penalty imposed, petitioned the state for a writ of habeas corpus
under Article 11.07. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 (Vernon 1977 & Supp.
1995) (detailing procedure for pursuing habeas relief).
18. Act of May 24, 1995, S.B. 440, § 1, 74th Leg., R.S. (to be codified at TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071).
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habeas corpus process concurrent with the ordinary appellate pro-
cess, so that at the conclusion of both processes, the condemned
person is left with no remedy other than limited federal relief.19
Prior to the enactment of Article 11.071, death penalty cases
proceeded through Texas's criminal appeals system,2° with final,
but infrequently obtained, review from the United States Supreme
Court.21 If the death-row inmate was unsuccessful in the appeals
process, he or she could attempt to obtain habeas corpus relief in
Texas state courts.22 If again unsuccessful, the convicted individual
could then seek habeas corpus relief in federal court,23 with the still
unlikely possibility of Supreme Court review.24
Although the habeas corpus process prior to the enactment of
Article 11.071 was long and tedious, it allowed persons who were
wrongly convicted and sentenced to death sufficient time to ac-
quire the evidence needed to prove their innocence.25 This newly
19. See Stephen P. Garvey, Death-Innocence and the Law of Habeas Corpus, 56 ALa.
L. REv. 225, 225 & n.1 (1992) (noting that in capital cases, federal courts can be petitioned
for habeas relief once state habeas proceedings are exhausted).
20. See, e.g., Matamoros v. State, 901 S.W.2d 470, 473-74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)
(hearing direct appeal from murder conviction and death sentence); see also Kelli Hinson,
Comment, Post-Conviction Determination of Innocence for Death Row Inmates, 48 SMU L.
REv. 231, 236 (1994) (detailing direct-appeal process for capital offenders, which attacks
"errors of law" apparent from record). See generally Chuck Miller et al., Annual Survey of
Texas Law: Criminal Law, 48 SMU L. REv. 1077, 1111 (1995) (discussing recent develop-
ments in capital murder trial procedure).
21. See Christopher E. Smith & Avis A. Jones, The Rehnquist Court's Activism and
the Risk of Injustice, 26 CONN. L. REv. 53, 64 (1993) (noting that Supreme Court rarely
grants review of habeas corpus cases because most certiorari petitions seeking such relief
are lacking novel legal issues or are unreviewable because issues raised make it impossible
to decide in prisoner's favor).
22. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1995) (outlin-
ing procedures for invoking writ of habeas corpus).
23. See JAMES S. LEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
97-103 (1985) (providing overview of federal habeas corpus process).
24. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 362 (1991) (estimating that Supreme Court only reviews
between three and seven habeas corpus cases per term involving state and federal
prisoners).
25. See James Cullen, 140 Days of Solony, TEX. OBSERVER, June 16, 1995, at 5
(describing how evidence of prisoner's innocence was hidden by sheriff's department and
not discovered until after conviction). The attorney for death-row inmate Andrew Lee
Mitchell spent five years obtaining a hearing. Id. At that hearing, eight years after Mitch-
ell had been convicted of capital murder, it was discovered that the Smith County Sheriff's
Department had concealed exculpatory evidence during trial. Id. In 1993, the Court of
Criminal Appeals finally released Mitchell from jail. Id.
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acquired evidence was often obtained through the assistance of
newspaper reporters, television journalists, or organized commu-
nity efforts.26 By shortening the time frame during which a
wrongly convicted person can acquire evidence of actual inno-
cence, Texas's new habeas corpus process may actually promote
the execution of innocent persons.
Texas's new law raises two primary questions. The first question
is whether an unseemly rush toward execution will measurably in-
crease the possibility of a miscarriage of justice at the expense of
innocent individuals. Although this first question is unanswered as
of yet, the Texas Legislature has promised that the answer will be
provided through the crucible of the new habeas corpus proce-
dure.27 The second question, and the one addressed in this Article,
is whether the new habeas corpus process passes muster under the
Texas Constitution, particularly the Texas Bill of Rights.28
26. See Kyles v. Whitley, 5 F.3d 806, 821-22 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining how television
report prompted witness to call police regarding car he purchased from murder suspect),
rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995); Fairchild v. Lockhart, 979 F.2d 636, 641 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting
that witness reported seeing murder suspect's car in area different from where abduction
occurred following television report), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3051 (1993); STAFF OF HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 103D CONG., 2 D SESS., REPORT ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 14
(Comm. Print 1994) (detailing story of documentary filmmaker Errol Morris who un-
earthed prosecutorial misconduct and obtained another person's taped confession, all in
search of convicted inmate's innocence); Letter from Dan Morales, Attorney General, to
Kathy Hackett, Texas Civil Rights Project (June 12, 1992) (on file with the St. Mary's Law
Journal) (noting that media attention revealed evidence of defendant's innocence that was
not presented at trial). Erroll Morris's film, The Thin Blue Line, uncovered inconsistencies
in the conviction trial of Randall Dale Adams. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDI-
CIARY, 103D CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 14 (Comm. Print 1994).
Adams was released from prison in 1989 after serving over 12 years for a crime he did not
commit. Id. at 7. For a more detailed discussion of the Randall Dale Adams story, see
Montgomery Brower et al., Crossing a Line That Is Not Thin at All, Randall Dale Adams
Wins Release from a Texas Prison, PEOPLE, Apr. 10, 1989, at 155, 155-56; Mark Singer,
Profiles-Errol Morris, NEW YORKER, Feb. 6, 1989, at 38, 38-72.
27. See William Murchison, We All Want Habeas Reform, TEX. LAW., Apr. 24, 1995, at
19 (noting that lawmakers are seeking to rectify criminal justice system's "inability ... to
match actions (executions) with intentions (sentences)"). Lawmakers refer to this as the
"scandal in the criminal justice system." Id.
28. The United States Supreme Court has been reluctant to intervene in state criminal
law matters that comport with the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. See Arthur F. Greenbaum, Government Participation in Private Litigation, 21 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 853, 902-05 & nn. 173-74 (discussing how Supreme Court has retreated from its
position of implied authority to sue for Fourteenth Amendment violations). Long before
the Fourteenth Amendment extended the reach of the federal bill of rights to protect
against abusive state power in criminal cases, the states were the sole protectors of free-
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The absolute guarantee of an individual's right to habeas corpus
relief is deeply embedded in Texas's history. Although federal de-
cisions have restricted the availability of federal habeas relief,29 an
examination of the intentions of the framers of each Texas consti-
tution strongly supports the preservation of the fundamental lib-
erty protection of habeas review afforded each Texan. Because the
writ's strength derives from the Texas Constitution, this Article
traces the history of the Texas habeas corpus provision, and specifi-
cally discusses the perspectives of various delegates to the constitu-
tional convention. A discussion of Texas case law follows, which
further solidifies the importance of habeas relief.
This Article asserts that Article 11.071 unconstitutionally re-
stricts the guarantee of the writ of habeas corpus by requiring
death-row inmates to file the writ concurrent with a direct appeal.
After a brief overview of the relevant provisions of Article 11.071,
this Article considers whether the Texas Legislature should be al-
lowed to shorten the time period for seeking habeas relief, given
the framers' circumspect construction of the writ guarantee. Next,
this Article queries whether Article 11.071 violates the due course
of law provisions of the Texas Constitution by denying death-row
inmates the opportunity to petition the courts to challenge the con-
stitutionality of the conviction. Finally, this Article addresses the
question of whether Article 11.071 runs afoul of the Texas equal
rights provision by withholding effective writ relief from only those
inmates condemned to death.
dom. See LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Tex. 1986) (stating that "the federal
constitution sets the floor for individual rights; state constitutions establish the ceiling").
For these reasons, this Article examines only the state constitutional arguments against
Article 11.071. In the criminal justice arena, state courts and state constitutions should be
the primary guarantors of individual rights and liberty.
29. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 487-90 (1991) (applying cause and prejudice
standard to abusive writs); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1981) (discussing how Great
Writ is costly to society and permits federal intrusion into state court decisions); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 480-82 (1976) (declining federal habeas relief for Fourth Amend.
ment claim when "full and fair opportunity" to litigate was previously provided by state
court).
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II. FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS ANALYSIS
A. Habeas Corpus in the United States Constitution
Although this Article does not measure the new Texas habeas
law against federal constitutional standards, a general overview of
federal habeas law is helpful to better understand the overall im-
portance of the writ. The principal purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to provide a prisoner with the means to challenge the
legality of his or her confinement outside of the ordinary appellate
process.30 Habeas corpus law in the United States has evolved
along two tracks-federal and state-yet the Great Writ itself ex-
isted long before the colonization of North America.31 Legal his-
torians have traced the origins of the writ back to the Magna
Carta.32 Over 450 years after the Magna Carta, the English Parlia-
ment passed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. 33 Early statutory ori-
gins of the writ indicate that its function was initially to challenge
arbitrary confinement by the English Crown's courts. 34  Signifi-
cantly, however, the American colonies later recognized the Great
Writ as a common-law right.35
The Framers of the United States Constitution incorporated the
fundamental liberty protection of habeas review into Article I, Sec-
tion 9, which states: "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Inva-
30. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963) (acknowledging government's re-
sponsibility for granting immediate release if imprisonment does not conform to funda-
mental requirements of law); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311-12 (1963) (recognizing
writ of habeas corpus as original civil proceeding for unlawful detention of liberty); Mc-
Nally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1934) (describing function of writ as inquiry into lawful-
ness of prisoner's detention).
31. See Max Rosenn, The Great Writ-A Reflection of Societal Change, 44 OHIO ST.
L.J. 337, 337-45 (1983) (providing historical background for development of habeas corpus
jurisprudence in United States).
32. See Clarke D. Forsythe, The Historical Origins of Broad Federal Habeas Review
Reconsidered, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1079, 1089 (1995) (noting that habeas corpus arose
from social and legal process of Magna Carta).
33. See id. at 1095-1101 (discussing historical development of 1679 act); see also Dal-
lin H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 451,
460-63 (1966) (discussing rules of implementation for Habeas Corpus Act of 1679).
34. Note, Development in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV L. REv. 1038,
1045 (1969) (noting that Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 grew out of jurisdictional warfare in




sion the public Safety may require it."'36 Subsequently, the First
Congress of the United States enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789,37
which gave federal courts jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus for federal prisoners.38 This jurisdiction was extended by
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, 39 which provided for federal judi-
cial review of cases involving state prisoners whose liberties were
restrained in violation of federal law.4° Congress codified the
Habeas Corpus Act with little change, extending federal habeas re-
lief to state prisoners to permit collateral review of their convic-
tions.41 Today, each state has its own habeas corpus provision;42
however, as this Article discusses, Texas's constitutional provision
is fairly unique in its absoluteness.
B. Federal Case Law
Over the past several years, the United States Supreme Court
has steadily narrowed federal habeas corpus relief.43 For example,
in Kuhlmann v. Wilson,44 the Supreme Court decided that a death-
row inmate should have only one chance to obtain federal habeas
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
37. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C.).
38. Id. ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. at 81-82 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651, 2254 (1988)).
39. Habeas Corpus Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (current version at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1988)).
40. Id. § 1, 14 Stat. at 385-87; see Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 398 (1879) (allowing
habeas corpus review to challenge constitutionality of prisoner's conviction).
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988) (stating that federal courts "shall entertain an ap-
plication for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in [state] custody... only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States"); Townsend, 372 U.S. at 311 (recognizing that hearing provisions of 1867 act
remain constant in current codification).
42. See Elizabeth A. Faulkner, The Right to Habeas Corpus: Only in the Other Ameri-
cas, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 653, 653-54 & n.5 (1994) (noting that freedom from
unlawful detention is basis for each state enacting its own habeas corpus statute).
43. See Kevin E. Teel, Federal Habeas Corpus: Relevance of the Guilt Determination
Process to Restriction of the Great Writ, 37 Sw. L.J. 519, 530-42 (1983) (discussing numer-
ous Supreme Court decisions that reveal Court's hostility toward federal habeas review
and reflect substantive and procedural hurdles that restricted habeas relief); see also Mau-
reen A. Dowd, Note, A Comparison of Section 1983 and Federal Habeas Corpus in State
Prisoners' Litigation, 59 NonRE DAME L. REv. 1315, 1322-25 (1984) (suggesting several
reasons for Supreme Court's narrowing of federal habeas review, including compromise of
finality of state criminal convictions, impact on state autonomy, and reduction of federal
caseload).
44. 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
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corpus relief.45 Moreover, in Teague v. Lane4 6 the Supreme Court
established an anti-retroactivity provision that precludes a writ ap-
plicant from seeking the benefit of new habeas corpus law.47
In Herrera v. Collins,48 the Court imposed further restrictions by
eliminating federal habeas relief for death-row inmates claiming
actual innocence. 49 The Supreme Court held in Herrera that a
claim of actual innocence does not entitle a death-row inmate to
federal relief because the trial court is the appropriate forum for
determining factual innocence or guilt in criminal cases.5 0  The
Court emphasized that federal habeas review exists not to correct
errors of fact, but to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in
violation of the due process requirements of the federal
constitution.5 '
Federal courts have also granted states broad discretion to deter-
mine the procedures governing postconviction remedies. 2 In fact,
state authorities need not even provide an avenue to collaterally
attack a conviction, or any mechanism for habeas corpus relief.53
This discretion has created a variety of principal postconviction
remedies among the states.5 4 Furthermore, deference to state post-
conviction remedies diminishes the necessity for federal habeas
45. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454 (stating that purpose of habeas corpus demands
that successive petitions for federal habeas relief should only be entertained "where pris-
oner supplements his constitutional claims with a colorable showing of actual innocence").
46. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
47. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
48. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
49. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 862-63.
50. Id. at 860.
51. Id.
52. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (noting that Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments do not require states to appoint counsel for prisoners seeking postconviction
relief); White v. Swenson, 261 F. Supp. 42, 56 (W.D. Mo. 1966) (stating that responsibility
for postconviction policy rests with state courts, and asserting that federal courts should
cooperate with implementation).
53. See United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 323 (1976) (noting that federal
constitution "does not establish any right to collaterally attack a final judgment of convic-
tion"); see also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423-24 (1963) (stating that habeas corpus is
purely civil remedy, rather than integral part of criminal justice system).
54. See Alice McGill, Comment, Murray v. Giarratano: Right to Counsel in Postcon-
viction Proceedings in Death Penalty Cases, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 211, 218-19 (1990)
(discussing jurisdictional differences in postconviction remedies, including how Texas's
remedy is based on common-law writ of habeas corpus, while other states have statutory
postconviction hearing acts or are modeled on federal habeas corpus statute).
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corpus relief.55  The Supreme Court's restrictive approach to
habeas corpus doctrine suggests that federal courts are unlikely to
find fault with the preclusive procedural contours and the substan-
tive import of Article 11.071.
III. THE TEXAS WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
A. History of Article I, Section 12: The Habeas Corpus Right
Although the federal habeas right has been severely restricted,
an examination of the intent of the framers of each Texas constitu-
tion illustrates that the right to habeas corpus relief is sacred in
Texas. Over a period of forty-three years-from 1833 to 1876-
the Great Writ became an inviolable writ of right in Texas, which
was never to be suspended. The importance of the writ of habeas
corpus throughout Texas's history is unquestionable. Texans have
lived under a number of different state constitutions, but each con-
stitution has contained a bill of rights with a habeas corpus
provision.56
Texas's constitutional history began in 1833, when a convention
of settlers who were disillusioned with the central government in
Mexico City assembled to propose a new constitution. 7 At that
time, Texas had not yet gained its independence from Mexico, and
was part of the State of Coahuila y Tejas.5 8 Led by Stephen F.
Austin, the delegates to the convention wished to disengage Texas
from Coahuila and make Texas a separate, sovereign state within
the Mexican confederation. 9 In seeking a localized government,
the Texas delegates considered the creation of a judiciary to be of
great importance to the independence of Texas.60 The delegates
55. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381-84 (1977) (finding District of Columbia's
postconviction remedy sufficient to protect applicants' federal right to collateral relief).
56. See Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (noting that
each of Texas's five constitutions since gaining independence from Mexico has placed bill
of rights in first article of constitution). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals noted that
the placement of the bill of rights "indicates the degree of importance of these provisions
to the drafters of the constitution and the citizens of this state." Id.
57. T.R. FEHRENBACH, LONE STAR: A HISTORY OF TEXAS AND THE TEXANS 180-81
(1983).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 181-82.
60. See DAVID G. BURNET, THE MEMORIAL TO CONGRESS REQUESTING SEPARATE
STATEHOOD (1833) (discussing problems with remote government, including crimes that
go unpunished and impracticable nature of judicial administration under centralized gov-
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also displayed concern over habeas corpus relief, as evidenced by
the language in Article 13 of the constitution proposed in 1833,
which read in part: "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, except when in cases of rebellion, or inva-
sion, the public safety may require it."'61 This language is verbatim
from the habeas corpus provision in the United States Constitu-
tion.62 Although the Mexican government rejected the proposed
1833 constitution, this document nonetheless laid a foundation for
the first Texas constitution.
In 1836, Texas became a free, sovereign, and independent repub-
lic, 63 vested with all the rights of an independent nation. The first
constitution, which was adopted by the Republic of Texas in 1836,
included a declaration of rights that contained the same habeas
corpus provision included in the 1833 proposed constitution.64 The
delegates responsible for the 1836 constitution declared that one of
the great injustices perpetrated by the Mexican government was
the wrongful incarceration of Stephen F. Austin, a Texas political
leader who had encouraged acceptance of the 1833 proposed con-
stitution.65 The framers of the constitution of the fledgling Repub-
lic were understandably distrustful of government, and believed
that the rights of the people should be free from governmental in-
trusion.66 Indeed, the framers forcefully stated their beliefs in the
preamble to the 1836 declaration of rights:
ernment), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF TEXAS HISTORY 76,78 (Ernest Wallace & David M.
Vigness eds., 1963). A localized judiciary would alleviate the problems associated with
having to seek justice "seven hundred miles distant from [the] central population." Id.
61. WILLIAM H. WHARTON, THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS
(1883), reprinted in DOcuMENTS OF TEXAS HISTORY 80 (Ernest Wallace & David M. Vig-
ness eds., 1963).
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
63. The Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Texas (1836), reprinted in
TEX. CONST. app. 478, 479 (Vernon 1993).
64. Constitution of the Republic of Texas, Declaration of Rights (1836), reprinted in
TEX. CONST. app. 493, 494 (Vernon 1993).
65. See Robert E. Hall, Remonstrance-Citizen's Weapon Against Government's In-
difference, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1417 (1990) (discussing arrest and incarceration of Ste-
phen F. Austin by Mexican government, which believed that Austin was guilty of treason in
attempting to establish independent state of Texas).
66. See Arvel (Rod) Ponton III, Sources of Liberty in the Texas Bill of Rights, 20 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 93, 96-97 (1988) (noting confluence of influences such as Jacksonian Democ-
racy Movement, American Revolution, English and Spanish common law, and abuses of




This declaration of rights is declared to be a part of this Constitution,
and shall never be violated on any pretence whatever. And in order
to guard against the transgression of the high powers which we have
delegated, we declare that everything in this bill of rights contained,
and every other right not hereby delegated, is reserved to the
people.67
Nine years later, delegates gathered for the 1845 statehood con-
vention, over which Thomas J. Rusk, a veteran of the 1836 conven-
tion, presided.68 The habeas corpus provision that emerged from
the 1845 convention remained textually identical to the 1833 pro-
posed constitution. 69 The provision, however, was severed from
the text of the 1836 declaration of rights and presented separately
as its own guarantee in the bill of rights.70 Additionally, the 1845
delegates moved the bill of rights from the end of the constitution
to the beginning, including it as Article I.71 The delegates prefaced
the bill of rights with the preamble: "That the general, great, and
essential principles of Liberty and Free Government may be recog-
nized and established, we declare that .... Thus, the framers of
the 1845 constitution clearly intended the bill of rights to protect
the rights of individuals. The bill of rights section in the two consti-
tutions that immediately followed-the 1861 secession constitution
and the 1866 post-Civil War constitution-contained the same
habeas corpus provision as the 1845 constitution.73
67. Constitution of the Republic of Texas, Declaration of Rights (1836), reprinted in
TEX. CONST. app. 493, 494 (Vernon 1993).
68. See Robert E. Hall, Remonstrance-Citizen's Weapon Against Government's In-
difference, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1420 (1990) (noting that Thomas J. Rusk served as Chief
Justice of Texas Supreme Court during Republic and was elected president of 1845 state-
hood convention).
69. TEX. CONST. of 1845 art. I, § 10, reprinted in TEX. CONST. app. 502, 503 (Vernon
1993).
70. Compare Constitution of the Republic of Texas, Declaration of Rights (1836) (in-
corporating habeas corpus provision with other language), reprinted in TEX. CONsr. app.
493,494 (Vernon 1993) with TEX. CONST. OF 1845 art. I, § 10 (allowing habeas provision to
stand on its own), reprinted in TEX. CoNsT. app. 502, 503 (Vernon 1993).
71. TEX. CONST. OF 1845 art. I, reprinted in TEX. CONsT. app. 502, 502 (Vernon 1993).
72. Id.
73. See TEX. CONST. of 1866 art. I, § 10 (noting that only under extreme circum-
stances, such as rebellion or threat to public safety, could habeas corpus be suspended),
reprinted in TEX. CONST. app. 557, 558 (Vernon 1993); TEX. CONST. of 1861 art. I, § 10
(determining that habeas corpus could not be suspended except under extreme circum-
stances), reprinted in TEX. CONSr. app. 529, 530 (Vernon 1993).
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Subsequently, as part of the Reconstruction movement, the dele-
gates gathered at the 1868 convention to rewrite the Texas Consti-
tution in accordance with Northern dictates. The 1868 convention
created a document that was representative of prevailing republi-
can thought and national centralization.74 The 1869 constitution
strengthened the right to habeas corpus relief by providing that
only the legislature could suspend the writ.75 Earlier Texas consti-
tutions had failed to specify who or which branch of government
could suspend the writ of habeas corpus, which led to the presump-
tion that anyone could suspend it.
In 1869, political turmoil ruled the day. With the help of the
Radical Republicans, and with the Carpetbaggers '76 penchant for
voting fraud and intimidation tactics, E.J. Davis was elected gover-
nor.77 Davis wreaked lawless havoc in Texas. He unilaterally
changed laws, extended his own term of office, placed all males
between the ages of eighteen and forty-five under his personal
command, created martial law under which he punished offenders,
granted criminals the honor of the police badge, and allowed this
renegade police force to terrorize the people.78 In 1874, the Texas
militia forced Governor Davis to surrender his governorship and
abide by his electoral defeat at the hands of Democrat Richard
Coke.79 Nevertheless, Davis's regime left behind a long and deeply
trodden path of political, judicial, and social damage."0
74. T.R. FEHRENBACH, LONE STAR: A HISTORY OF TEXAS AND THE TEXANS 411
(1983). In 1868, Texas democrats attempted to invalidate a state election, which republi-
cans won by sitting out of the elections. Id. The elections were not invalidated, and be-
cause of the republican victory, only six of the men that attended the 1866 constitutional
convention attended the constitutional convention of 1868. Id.
75. TEX. CONST. of 1869 art. I, § 10, reprinted in TEX. CONST. app. 591, 592 (Vernon
1993). The provision stated, "The privileges of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be sus-
pended, except by act of the Legislature, in case of rebellion or invasion, when the public
safety may require it." Id.
76. See T.R. FEHRENBACH, LONE STAR: A HISTORY OF TEXAS AND THE TEXANS
412-13 (1983) (noting that term "Carpetbaggers" referred to political and economic oppor-
tunists who arrived in Texas after Civil War carrying all of their worldly goods in cloth
travel bags). Carpetbaggers were political buccaneers searching for opportunity in the af-
termath of the war. Id. at 413.
77. Id. at 413-15.
78. Id. at 416-26.
79. Id. at 431-32.




When the constitutional convention of 1875 assembled, Texans
were permanently scarred by the governmental abuse they had suf-
fered, and they were strongly influenced by the pre-Populist
Grange movement.81 They manifested their political reaction and
disdain for big business in the deliberately "anti-government" doc-
ument that they created.82 The dominant purpose of the 1876 con-
stitution was to restrict the powers of state government by tying the
hands of the legislative and executive branches. 83 The 1876 consti-
tution memorialized Texans' sentiments that no government, legis-
lature, or governor should be trusted. The issues that concerned
the 1875 delegates were strikingly similar to those that troubled the
drafters of the 1836 constitution. 84 The delegates sought to ensure
that Texans would never again experience governmental abuse of
their rights. 85 Consequently, in 1876, the right to a writ of habeas
corpus became an absolute right.
The constitution of 1876 revised the language of the habeas
corpus provision in three important ways. First, the writ of habeas
corpus became an inviolable "writ of right," rather than a mere
"privilege" as in prior constitutions. 86 Second, the writ became a
right never to be suspended under any circumstance, not even by
the legislature, whereas under the 1869 constitution, the legislature
had the sole power to suspend the writ.87 Finally, the 1876 consti-
tution directed the legislature to "enact laws to render the remedy
81. For more detailed discussions of the decidedly populist bent of the 1875 conven-
tion and the origins of the 1876 constitution, see JAMES C. HARRINGTON, TEXAS BILL OF
RIGHTS LITIGATION MANUAL §§ 3.2-.3 (2d ed. 1994); John W. Mauer, State Constitutions
in a Time of Crisis: The Case of the Texas Constitution of 1876, 68 TEX. L. REv. 1615,
1624-27 (1990); Mikal Watt & Brad Rockwell, The Original Intent of the Education Article
of the Texas Constitution, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 771, 785-91 (1990); John W. Mauer, Southern
State Constitutions in the 1870's: A Case Study of Texas passim (1981) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Rice University) (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal).
82. See T.R. FEHRENBACH, LONE STAR: A HISTORY OF TEXAS AND THE TEXANS
434-35 (1983) (noting that Texas Constitution of 1876 was "antigovernment instrument").
83. Id. at 435.
84. Id. at 437.
85. Id.
86. Compare TEX. CONST. art. I, § 12 (stating that "[tlhe writ of habeas corpus is a
writ of right") (emphasis added) with TEX. CONST. OF 1845 art. I, § 10 (stating that "[t]he
privileges of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended") (emphasis added), re-
printed in TEX. CONST. app. 502, 503 (Vernon 1993).
87. Compare TEX. CONST. art. I, § 12 (stating that "[t]he writ of habeas corpus ...
shall never be suspended") (emphasis added) with TEX. CONST. OF 1869 art. I, § 10 (estab-
lishing that "[t]he privileges of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except by
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speedy and effectual." s Thus, the wording of the 1876 provision
represents a marked departure from all former habeas corpus
provisions.
The 1875 convention debates on the adoption of the bill of rights
clarify the meaning and purpose behind at least two of these
changes to the habeas corpus provision. Before final passage, the
delegates engaged in extensive discourse regarding how, if at all, to
amend the habeas corpus section of the previous constitution.89
During this time, the delegates debated the meaning of the term
"natural right."9 One of the delegates, E.L. Dohoney, argued that
because "liberty was a personal right, and the writ of habeas corpus
was the right to protect that natural right," habeas corpus was a
"writ of right."91 This language is reflected in the bill of rights pro-
vision which provides that the natural right of liberty should never
be taken away except by due course of law.9 Accordingly, habeas
corpus-the writ of right-came to protect the individual's natural
right of liberty.
The 1875 delegates further stipulated that the legislature should
not have the power to suspend the writ.93 Delegate W.B. Wright,
describing the sentiments of the convention delegates, stated:
"History repeated itself, and they could not tell what legislatures
might do in the future when they obtained control of those halls,
but they knew what they [the legislators] had done in the past ten
years. '94 In addition, delegate George Flournoy proclaimed that
he "could not foresee any condition of things when it should not be
lawful for a citizen of Texas to appeal to the courts of his coun-
act of the legislature") (emphasis added), reprinted in TEX. CONST. app. 591, 592 (Vernon
1993).
88. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 12.
89. See DEBATES IN THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION OF 1875, at 290-95 (Seth S. McKay
ed., 1930) (summarizing delegates' discussions regarding underlying importance of writ of
habeas corpus).
90. See id. at 291 (discussing meaning of term "natural right").
91. Id. at 292.
92. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19.
93. See DEBATES IN THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION OF 1875, at 290-94 (Seth S. McKay
ed., 1930) (discussing various Texas delegates' views concerning legislative power to sus-
pend writ of habeas corpus).
94. Id. at 292. When delegate F.S. Stockdale proposed that the writ should be sus-
pended by the legislature in times of war and unrest, Wright purportedly replied that the
legislature "should not have the power to suspend the writ, no matter what the circum-
stances, and that a man's liberty should not be taken except by due course of law." Id.
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try."'95 As a result of these sentiments, the 1876 Texas Bill of
Rights concludes with a final section that states: "[E]verything in
this 'Bill of Rights' is excepted out of the general powers of gov-
ernment, and shall forever remain inviolate, and all laws contrary
thereto, or to the following provisions, shall be void."96 This final
provision is consistent with the language and ideas embodied forty
years earlier in the preamble to the Republic's declaration of
rights,97 and is itself a guarantee of the inalienability of the Texas
Bill of Rights guarantees. 98
The delegates' third change to the habeas corpus provision-the
addition of the "speedy and effectual" provision-compels the
courts to construe habeas corpus relief broadly. 99 The constitution
refers to the relief itself when it speaks of the habeas corpus rem-
edy being speedy and effectual. Therefore, to further deter
abridgement of personal liberty, habeas corpus relief must be
speedy.100 This right to speedy relief, however, belongs to the indi-
95. Id. at 293. Another delegate, Charles DeMorse, reportedly said that "the little
clause [habeas corpus] contained the whole charter of human liberty capable of expression
on paper, and he trusted that [the legislature] would not change it in one word or sign." Id.
The delegates subsequently tabled all proposals to change and limit the writ of habeas
corpus. Id. at 294. In a last-ditch effort to allow the legislature to suspend habeas corpus,
Stockdale proposed that the legislature be granted the affirmative power to suspend all
laws. Id. This proposal was voted down by a 34 to 26 margin. Id. at 295.
96. TEX. CONsT. art. I, § 29.
97. See Constitution of the Republic of Texas, Declaration of Rights (1836) (stating,
"This declaration of rights is declared to be a part of this Constitution, and shall never be
violated on any pretence whatever."), reprinted in TEX. CONST. app. 493, 493 (Vernon
1993).
98. See James P. Hart, The Bill of Rights: Safeguard of Individual Liberty, 35 TEX. L.
REv. 919, 920 (1957) (explaining that, while Article I, § 29 may appear redundant because
it bolsters rights already enumerated in bill of rights, it serves to absolutely ensure that all
rights in bill of rights are beyond reach of governmental interference).
99. See DEBATES IN THE TEXAS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, at 292-95
(Seth S. McKay ed., 1930) (describing various Texas delegates' views concerning proper
breadth of habeas corpus relief). This interpretation is in harmony with the framers' posi-
tion that the legislature cannot tamper with the writ of habeas corpus because it is the
individual's means of protecting the natural right to personal liberty. See id. at 292-94
(describing framers' position on natural right to personal liberty and habeas corpus
review).
100. The repudiation of the collateral bar rule, which prevented indirect challenges to
a conviction before a conviction was directly challenged, is another indicator of the preemi-
nent importance of habeas relief in Texas. See Ex parte Thcci, 859 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. 1993)
(describing collateral bar rule, and noting that Texas courts do not adhere to it). Thus, a
citizen can test the validity of a court order by disobeying it and then seeking habeas relief
when jailed, rather than appealing the original order through the courts. Id. On the other
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vidual, not to the government. The "speedy and effectual" provi-
sion assures that the person wrongfully deprived of freedom will
receive a speedy hearing on a habeas corpus petition. The provi-
sion does not exist to allow the legislature to accelerate the habeas
corpus process to accommodate legislators' own agendas.
One final note about the origins of Texas's current constitution
underscores the importance of the writ of habeas corpus, namely,
the framers' deference to the judiciary as guardian of individual
liberty. Although the framers of the 1876 constitution deliberately
crafted a document that severely limited the power of the legisla-
tive and executive branches, they exhibited deference to the judi-
cial branch. 1°1 In fact, the one provision of the 1876 constitution
that departed from the "systematically restrictive approach" of the
new organic charter was the hotly debated judiciary article.10 2
Under this article, the delegates ultimately deferred to the compre-
hensive role of the courts, which were "charged with high and holy
duties."'01 3  The delegates apparently believed that the courts,
rather than other state authorities, would best protect individual
liberties.' °4 Thus, the people of Texas long ago entrusted the judi-
ciary with enforcing the newly defined absolute right of habeas
hand, federal habeas corpus jurisprudence does adhere to the collateral bar rule. See
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320 (1967) (noting that petitioners, one of
whom was Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., "could not bypass orderly judicial review of [an]
injunction before disobeying it").
101. See Shepherd v. San Jacinto Junior College Dist., 363 S.W.2d 742, 743 (Tex. 1962)
(explaining that Texas Constitution, unlike federal constitution, is not so much grant of
powers as it is limitation on government); John W. Mauer, State Constitutions in a Time of
Crisis: The Case of the Texas Constitution of 1876, 68 TEX. L. REv. 1615, 1626 (1990)
(recognizing that 1876 constitution set limits on state officials' salaries and curtailed legisla-
ture's power to pass certain types of laws); see also James C. Harrington, Framing a Texas
Bill of Rights Argument, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 399, 430-31 (1993) (discussing how 1876 con-
stitution shows change in political climate from expansive central government to populist
limited government); cf Samuel D. Myres, Mysticism, Realism and the Texas Constitution
of 1876, 9 Sw. Soc. Sci. Q. 166, 173 (1928) (describing constitution of 1876 as "human
document" that evidences attempt to overhaul government completely and restrict any
future abuses).
102. John W. Mauer, Southern State Constitutions in the 1870's: A Case Study of
Texas 246 (1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University) (on file with the St.
Mary's Law Journal).
103. Id. at 248.
104. To ensure judicial accountability and prevent abuses of power, the delegates pro-
vided for the direct election of judges. See id. at 242-43 (noting how convention protected
individual voters by refusing to gerrymander state judicial districts for benefit of white
supremacy).
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corpus and demanded that the legislature keep its hands off the
Great Writ and assure its speedy and effectual implementation.10 5
B. Texas Case Law
Despite the rather exceptional evolution of the Texas constitu-
tional habeas corpus right, there is a remarkable dearth of case law
defining the contours of the right and what is meant by effectual
implementation. 10 6 Many habeas corpus cases have found their
way into the reporters, but most turn on whether the underlying
facts support habeas relief.0 7 Accordingly, the cases contain little
applicable criteria for determining the scope of habeas relief.10 8
Development of Texas habeas corpus jurisprudence lies within
the exclusive purview of the state judiciary and, ultimately, with
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. 09 Consequently, Texas
judges may devote as much or as little of their creative legal talent
105. As General L.D. Ross put it during a convention debate, "That great writ and an
independent judiciary go hand in hand, and either is powerless without the other, but com-
bined they form the cornerstone of the citizen's liberty." DEBATES IN THE TEXAS CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, at 428 (Seth S. McKay ed., 1930).
106. The cases merely define the import of habeas corpus by determining its proce-
dural scope. See, e.g., Ex parte Minor, 146 Tex. Crim. 159, 161, 172 S.W.2d 347, 347 (1943)
(emphasizing that writ of habeas corpus cannot provide substitute for appeal); Ex parte
Meador, 93 Tex. Crim. 450, 451, 248 S.W. 348, 349 (1923) (stating that all provisions relat-
ing to writ of habeas corpus "shall be favorably construed in order to give effect to the
remedy and protect the rights of the person seeking relief"); Ex parte Degener, 30 Tex.
Crim. 566, 577, 17 S.W. 1111, 1115 (1891) (establishing that review by habeas corpus ex-
tends not only to whether confinement is lawful, but also to manner and degree of
restraint).
107. See Ex pane Davis, 866 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (asserting habeas
relief from death penalty sentence should be granted because of error during voir dire); Ex
parte Kunkle, 852 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (considering writ of habeas
corpus filed for failure to instruct jury on mitigating evidence); Ex parte Earvin, 816 S.W.2d
379, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (dismissing writ of habeas corpus because it was improvi-
dently filed).
108. Significantly, though, numerous decisions have used habeas corpus relief to test
the legality of an underlying court order or the constitutionality of a statute, without re-
quiring that the order or statute first be challenged in an appeal. Historically, Texas courts
have granted habeas relief to individuals challenging the constitutionality of restrictions on
freedom of expression. E.g., Ex parte Thcci, 859 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. 1993); Ex parte Henry,
147 Tex. 315, 331, 215 S.W.2d 588, 597 (1948); Ex pane McCormick, 129 Tex. Crim. 457,
462, 88 S.W.2d 104, 107 (1935).
109. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5 (extending final appellate jurisdiction in criminal
cases to Texas Court of Criminal Appeals); Ex parte Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 829-30 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1967) (delineating jurisdiction of Texas Court of Criminal Appeals over peti-
tions for writs of habeas corpus); Ex parte Boman, 160 Tex. Crim. 148, 149, 268 S.W.2d 186,
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as they choose, unfettered by federal case law, to the development
of Texas habeas corpus jurisprudence. In Heitman v. State,110 a
"magna carta" of Texas state court constitutionalism, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals held that under our system of federal-
ism, "the states are free to reject federal holdings as long as state
action does not fall below the minimum standards provided by fed-
eral constitutional protections.""' Therefore, although the court
has not yet created much independent Texas constitutional juris-
prudence, it may interpret Article I, Section 12 of the Texas Consti-
tution-the habeas corpus guarantee-in a manner that affords
Texas citizens greater protection than that allowed by Article I,
Section 9 of the United States Constitution. 112
The Texas habeas corpus jurisprudence that has developed thus
far at least illustrates the importance of the Texas habeas corpus
right. For example, in Ex parte Brandley,13 the court ruled that a
writ of habeas corpus is an appropriate vehicle under Texas law for
testing a due process violation." 4 Further, in Ex parte Bravo,' 15
the court declared that habeas corpus is necessary "to review juris-
dictional defect[s] or denials of fundamental or constitutional
rights.""16 The court again determined in Ex parte Binder"7 that
habeas corpus relief should be available in cases involving a viola-
tion of a constitutional right.118 The court went even further in
State ex rel. Holmes v. Third Court of Appeals,119 and found that a
187 (1954) (holding that upon final felony conviction, writs of habeas corpus should be
heard in Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, not district courts).
110. 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
111. Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 682.
112. See Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1985) (asserting that decision
made under state constitution rendered unnecessary any discussion of federal constitu-
tion); James C. Harrington, Framing a Texas Bill of Rights Argument, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J.
399, 437-41 (1993) (suggesting framework for litigation of state constitutional issues, and
noting that use of independent state constitutional grounds potentially removes United
States Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review decision).
113. 781 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 817 (1990).
114. Brandley, 781 S.W.2d at 887.
115. 702 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
116. Bravo, 702 S.W.2d at 193; see also Ex parte Banks, 769 S.W.2d 539, 540 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1989) (holding that proper grounds for habeas corpus review includes jurisdic-
tional defects and denials of fundamental rights).
117. 660 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), overruled in part by State ex rel. Holmes
v. Third Court of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
118. Binder, 660 S.W.2d at 106.
119. 885 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
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writ of habeas corpus should be available for death-row inmates
who can produce newly discovered evidence of actual innocence. 2 °
The court stated that to hold otherwise would amount to an execu-
tion in violation of a constitutional and fundamental right.12 Thus,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized that the Texas
habeas corpus right is significant, even though the court has not yet
clearly defined the dimensions of habeas relief.
IV. TEXAS'S NEW HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURE FOR DEATH
PENALTY CASES
The recent legislative amendments to Texas's habeas procedures
stand in stark contrast to the case law and constitutional develop-
ments that illustrate the significance of the Great Writ in Texas.
Article 11.071 dramatically alters the habeas corpus procedure for
applicants seeking relief from a death penalty sentence. The new
article, which became effective September 1, 1995, generally re-
quires that a habeas corpus proceeding run concurrent with the ap-
plicant's direct appeal.
Under Article 11.071, a death-row inmate must apply for habeas
corpus relief no later than forty-five days after filing the original
brief on direct appeal. 22 Late applications are presumed untimely,
and with the exception of a few very narrow circumstances in
which a convicted capital felon can establish "good cause by show-
ing particularized, justifying circumstances" for the delay, a death-
120. Holmes, 885 S.W.2d at 397-98. For a lengthier discussion of this decision and its
procedural history, see James C. Harrington, Does Real Innocence Count in Capital Con-
victions?, 1 TEX. FORUM Civ. LiB. & Civ. Rrs. 38, 39-44 (1994).
121. Holmes, 885 S.W.2d at 397. At the very least, Holmes establishes a due course of
law right not to be executed when there is evidence of actual innocence. The court in
Holmes interpreted the United States Supreme Court's decision in Herrera v. Collins, 113
S. Ct. 853 (1993), to mean that the execution of an innocent person would amount to a
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The court of crim-
inal appeals agreed with the Herrera proposition, and held that habeas corpus provided the
appropriate vehicle by which a death-row inmate could assert an actual innocence claim
based on newly discovered evidence. Id. at 398.
122. Act of May 24, 1995, S.B. 440, § 1(4)(a), 74th Leg., R.S. (to be codified at TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071). An applicant convicted before September 1, 1995,
with no habeas petition pending, must file for habeas relief within 180 days from the date
counsel is appointed or within 45 days after the original brief is due on direct appeal,
whichever is later. Id.
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row inmate may apply for only one writ of habeas corpus."2 3 Any
amended or subsequent application must also establish good cause
and must be filed no later than ninety-one days after the applicable
due date for the original writ application. 124 Untimely applications
are not considered unless the application sets forth specific facts
establishing: (1) that the claims could not have been timely raised
because the factual or legal bases for the claims were unavailable in
the exercise of due diligence; (2) by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that, but for a federal constitutional violation, no rational
juror could have found the capital felon guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt; or (3) by clear and convincing evidence that, but for a fed-
eral constitutional violation, no rational juror would have answered
one or more of the special issues in the State's favor.'2 5 Moreover,
failure to show good cause and file before the expiration of ninety-
one days constitutes "a waiver of all grounds for relief that were
available to the applicant before the last day on which an applica-
tion could be timely filed.' 26
This new procedure only applies to persons who are condemned
to death. 27 The legislature did not impose a time period within
which the writ must be sought in noncapital cases.' 28 However, the
legislature narrowed the habeas corpus procedure in noncapital
cases somewhat by permitting, with few exceptions, only one
habeas corpus application. 29
Apart from rigidly confining the new habeas corpus process so
that it runs concurrently with direct appeals in capital cases, the
74th Legislature created various other procedural limitations on
the right to habeas relief. First, the legislature limited the Texas
123. See id. § 1(4)(b) (providing that late applications are to be presumed untimely
and may not be considered unless specific facts are established by applicant).
124. Id. § 1(4)(h).
125. Id. § 1(5)(a)(1)-(3).
126. Act of May 24, 1995, S.B. 440 § 1(4)(g), 74th Leg., R.S. (to be codified at TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071).
127. Id. § 1.
128. Although this Article does not directly discuss the recent changes to habeas
corpus procedure for noncapital cases, many of the arguments presented herein are equally
applicable to those changes as well.
129. See id. § 5(4)(a)(1)-(2) (listing two exceptions in which subsequent applications
for writ of habeas corpus may be filed in noncapital cases).
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Court of Criminal Appeals' ability to engage in rulemaking, 130 ap-
parently in an attempt to prevent the courts from ameliorating the
harshness of the new statute.'3 ' Second, despite the addition of the
provision for appointing "competent" habeas corpus counsel, Arti-
cle 11.071 does not set forth any standards to ensure the compe-
tency of appointed attorneys. 132 This point is particularly relevant
because many habeas corpus claimants raise the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel in death penalty cases. 33 Additionally, in a
somewhat disingenuous way, this provision makes the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals a party to undermining the writ's efficacy. Be-
cause the court of criminal appeals is responsible for appointing
competent counsel upon an application for a writ of habeas
corpus, 34 the court may not be too willing to find that an attorney
it appointed in a capital habeas case provided ineffective assistance
of counsel such that the court must set aside a conviction. Finally,
130. Id. § 6. Section 6 restricts the court's rulemaking authority regarding the new
provisions of Article 11.071 to the extent that the court's appellate rules are not to conflict
with the statutory procedures. Id. This section precludes the court from attempting to
elevate Texas constitutional violations to the same level as federal constitutional violations.
131. This observation raises the issue of whether Article 11.071 violates Texas's sepa-
ration of powers doctrine, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Article. See
generally TEX. CONST. art. If, § 1 (establishing Texas's separation of governmental powers);
Meshell v. State, 739 S.W.2d 246, 254-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (discussing Texas's sepa-
ration of powers doctrine); Harold A. Bruff, Separation of Powers Under the Texas Consti-
tution, 68 TEX. L. REv. 1337, 1337 (1990) (describing separation of powers under Texas
law).
132. See Act of May 24, 1995, S.B. 440, § 1(2), 74th Leg., R.S. (to be codified at TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071) (establishing habeas applicant's statutory right to
"competent counsel," but failing to establish standards of competency). The Texas Legisla-
ture merely outlined the appointment process for attorneys "qualified" to handle death
penalty cases in district courts. See id. § 2 (stating that presiding judge of convicting court
appoints trial counsel from list of qualified attorneys as soon as practicable after charges
are filed).
133. See Michael D. Hintze, Attacking the Death Penalty: Toward a Renewed Strategy
Twenty Years After Furman, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 395, 410-11 & n.86 (1993)
(discussing how complexity of law in death penalty cases leads to numerous constitutional
errors, most common of which is ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Stephen B.
Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst
Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1837-41 (1944) (describing death penalty cases in which attor-
neys failed to present evidence of defendants' mental impairments); cf. THE SPANGENBERO
GROUP, A STUDY OF REPRESENTATION IN CAPITAL CASES IN TEXAS 97 (Mar. 1993) (pre-
pared for State Bar of Tex.) (emphasizing importance of representation in capital cases
because state habeas questions of ineffective counsel are raised first on appeal).
134. Act of May 24, 1995, S.B. 440, § 2(d), 74th Leg., R.S. (to be codified at TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.052).
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under Article 11.071, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals must
determine reasonable compensation for appointed counsel, to
whom payment is made from state funds. 35 The reimbursement of
investigative expenses is left to the discretion of the court. 136 The
attorney must reveal and justify the expenses incurred to the
court, 37 which may chill defense strategy because the court has dis-
cretion to deny reimbursement of expenses.
Because of its severe restrictions, the new habeas procedure
raises substantial questions concerning its viability. For example,
certain standard points of reversal on direct appeal, such as ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, a violation of a constitutional right, or
any other error that surfaces during or after the direct appeal, may
be precluded from habeas corpus review simply because the habeas
proceeding occurs simultaneously with the appeal. Thus, certain
reversible errors may not mature or be timely recognized for con-
sideration in the habeas corpus review. Furthermore, the error
may not be strong enough to meet the rigid good-cause exceptions
that allow for amended or subsequent habeas review.138
V. TEXAS'S NEW HABEAS CORPUS LAW VIOLATES SPECIFIC
TEXAS BILL OF RIGHTS PROTECTIONS
The Texas Legislature's attempt to expedite capital executions
through Article 11.071 illuminates the twin problems that plague
the death penalty system. First, death-row inmates must be en-
sured that they will receive effective legal representation at all
stages of the appellate process. 39 Second, sufficient procedural
135. Act of May 24, 1995, S.B. 440, § 1(2)(h), 74th Leg., R.S. (to be codified at TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071).
136. See id. § 1(3) (explaining procedure for reimbursement of expenses).
137. Id. § 1(3)(d).
138. See Act of May 24, 1995, S.B. 440, § 1(5)(a)(1)-(3), 74th Leg., R.S. (to be codified
at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071) (setting forth exceptions that allow for review
of subsequent or untimely writ application). The rather remarkable facet of this section is
that late relief may be obtained for a violation of the United States Constitution, which the
United States Supreme Court already requires, but not for a violation of the Texas Consti-
tution. See id. (noting that exceptions are triggered only upon finding of violation of
United States Constitution). There is no legislative history explaining why lawmakers rele-
gated Texas's own constitution to such an inferior position, although a reasonable suspicion
is that they feared the Texas judiciary would create its own jurisprudence. Whether Texas
judges will meekly accept this badge of inferiority remains to be seen.
139. See THE SPANOENBERG GROUP, A STUDY OF REPRESENTATION IN CAPITAL
CASES IN TEXAS 96-97 (Mar. 1993) (prepared for State Bar of Tex.) (advocating substan-
[Vol. 27:69
HABEAS CORPUS
safeguards against executing innocent people must be provided. 4 0
As previously discussed, the new habeas corpus law fails to address
the former problem because the law contains no guidelines to en-
sure the competency of legal counsel. 14' The question of whether
or not the latter problem is sufficiently addressed by the new
habeas corpus law can be answered by an inquiry into the constitu-
tionality of Article 11.071.
A. Article I, Section 12: Habeas Corpus
The severe limitations that Article 11.071 imposes on the right to
habeas corpus threaten to render the writ wholly ineffectual, and
such a result would be in direct conflict with the design of the writ's
crafters. Article I, Section 12 of the Texas Constitution states:
"The writ of habeas corpus is a writ of right, and shall never be
suspended. The Legislature shall enact laws to render the remedy
speedy and effectual.' 1 42 The actual phrasing of this Texas consti-
tutional guarantee provides for a greater habeas right than does
the federal constitution's habeas corpus provision. 143 The federal
provision defines habeas corpus as a mere "privilege," and couches
it negatively as a restriction on the United States government that
may be suspended in cases of rebellion or invasion as public safety
requires. 44 Therefore, the Texas Constitution's recognition of the
writ as a right, and the explicit command that it be "effectual," may
well signal the demise of Article 11.071 because the new law's nar-
row limitations on habeas corpus relief exemplify the potential leg-
tial change in process through which counsel is appointed in habeas corpus cases). The
1993 report published by the Spangenberg Group identifies problems associated with rep-
resentation in habeas corpus cases. Id. The report notes the lack of a state-funded public
defender system in Texas, as well as the inability of a defendant to raise ineffectiveness of
counsel claims until after conviction. Id.
140. KELLIE DWORACZYK, AFTER THE DEATH SENTENCE: APPEALS, CLEMENCY AND
REPRESENTATION 12 (Apr. 4, 1994) (House Research Organization) (determining that
60% of death sentences are not reversed when appealed on constitutional or procedural
defects).
141. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
142. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 12.
143. See Arvel (Rod) Ponton III, Sources of Liberty in the Texas Bill of Rights, 20 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 93, 111 (1988) (explaining that framers of Texas Constitution, by using affirm-
ative language, intended to grant even greater rights to individuals than those provided by
United States Constitution).
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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islative abuse that the framers of the Texas Constitution sought to
prevent. 14 5
Furthermore, the constitution's grant of power to the legislature
to enact laws to facilitate habeas corpus relief cannot be construed
as permitting statutes of limitations. 146 The legislature should be
limited to only those changes that would cause habeas corpus relief
to be a faster and more effective remedy for the individual. Imple-
menting changes for the sake of expediting the pace of executions
is quite antithetical to the very purpose of the Great Writ.'47
The extent to which the legislature can narrow the time frame
within which to file for habeas corpus relief presents a perplexing
problem. 48 This issue arose in a death penalty case in Missis-
sippi,149 and in a noncapital case in Iowa. 150 Both states upheld
three-year statutes of limitations; however, both limitations stat-
utes provided exceptions that permitted applicants to file for
habeas relief after the three-year period.' 5' Moreover, the consti-
tutional habeas corpus provisions of Iowa and Mississippi specifi-
cally permit legislative restrictions; therefore, they are not absolute
145. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
146. Cf. DEBATES IN THE TEXAS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, at 290-95
(Seth S. McKay ed., 1930) (noting delegates' views concerning importance of making right
to writ of habeas corpus inviolable).
147. Cf. id. at 293 (explaining that framers of habeas corpus provision "could not fore-
see any condition of things when it should not be lawful for a citizen of Texas to appeal to
the courts of his country to say whether or not he was guilty of crime").
148. See Michael A. Mello & Donna Duffy, Suspending Justice: The Unconstitutional-
ity of the Proposed Six-Month Time Limit on the Filing of Habeas Corpus Petitions by
Death Row Inmates, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 451, 452 (1990-91) (concluding
that imposing time limits for filing habeas petitions violates Suspension Clause of United
States Constitution).
149. See Culberson v. State, 612 So. 2d 342, 347 (Miss. 1992) (considering statute of
limitations imposed upon habeas relief).
150. See Davis v. State, 443 N.W.2d 707, 709 (Iowa 1989) (addressing issue of whether
state constitutional prohibition on state's power to suspend writs of habeas corpus prohib-
its state from establishing reasonable time restrictions).
151. See Culberson, 612 So. 2d at 346 (upholding statute of limitations, and stating
that exceptions to Mississippi's statute of limitations are restricted to intervening decisions
of supreme court of either Mississippi or United States "which would actually adversely
affect the outcome of the conviction or sentence"); Davis, 443 N.W.2d at 708 (finding
Iowa's statute of limitations constitutional, and noting that statute "does not apply to a
ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time period").
The dissent in Culberson contended that the Mississippi statute violated both the federal
and state constitutions by creating time limitations for seeking remedies for convictions
that deprive persons of life or liberty. Culberson, 612 So. 2d at 353 (Banks, J., dissenting).
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guarantees like the writ guarantee in Texas.152 Because the writ
guarantee in Texas is absolute, Article 11.071 likely offends the
spirit of the habeas corpus provision in the Texas Bill of Rights.
B. Article I, Section 13: Open Courts and Due Course of Law
The Texas constitutional provision that guarantees access to the
courts is commonly referred to as the "open courts" provision, and
represents the foundation of the Texas due course of law doc-
trine. 53 Article I, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution provides
that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done
him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law.' 54 The open courts provision originated from
chapter 40 of the Magna Carta, which declared: "To none will we
sell, to none deny or delay, right or justice.' 1 55 Texas courts have
long viewed the open courts provision as guaranteeing a substan-
tive right of redress, 56 and both the express language of the open
152. The Iowa Constitution provides that "[tihe writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, or refused when application is made as required by law, unless in case of rebel-
lion or invasion the public safety may require it." IOWA CONST. art. I, § 13. Thus, the
framers of the Iowa Constitution expressly provided general authority for legislative re-
striction on the exercise of the right of habeas corpus. Davis, 443 N.W.2d at 709. The
Mississippi Constitution similarly states that "[tihe privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in the case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety
may require it, nor ever without the authority of the legislature." Miss. CONST. art. III,
§ 21.
153. See Texas Workers Compensation Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 520 (Tex.
1995) (describing scope of Texas's open courts guarantee). Because liberty is so important,
Texans have yet another constitutional due course of law provision. The Texas due course
of law provision is somewhat similar to the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment,
although stronger in terms of individual citizen protection, and states: "No citizen of this
State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner
disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19. In
fact, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the due course of law provision
of the Texas Constitution may afford greater protection than the Fourteenth Amendment.
See City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982) (noting that state
courts are free to read their own constitutions more broadly than Supreme Court reads
federal constitution). For a more detailed discussion of Texas's open courts and due course
of law provisions, see JAMES C. HARRINGTON, TEXAS BILL OF RIGHTS LITIGATION MAN-
UAL §§ 5.1-.4 (2d ed. 1994).
154. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
155. Id. interp. commentary (Vernon 1984).
156. See Clem v. Evans, 291 S.W. 871, 872 (Tex. 1927) (holding that statute which
places burden of proof for disproving fraud on defendants and requires defendants to
prove they were prevented from fulfilling promise "by act of God, the public enemy, or by
some other equitable reason," violates Article I, § 13 of Texas Constitution because it de-
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courts guarantee and the caselaw interpreting that guarantee em-
phasize its importance. 57
The text of the open courts provision reflects the high value that
the drafters and ratifiers attached to the right of redress. For ex-
ample, the language of the provision is mandatory and comprehen-
sive. 58 Additionally, there is no emergency exception, and the all-
encompassing open courts language differs significantly from the
qualifying phrases found in other sections of the Texas Bill of
Rights.'5 9
The caselaw interpreting the open courts guarantee is equally re-
vealing. Since the adoption of the current constitution, the Texas
Supreme Court time and again has reaffirmed its abiding commit-
ment to the open courts right. 60 For example, in Sax v. Votteler,16 1
the Texas Supreme Court invalidated a special medical malpractice
nies defendants access to courts); Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96, 109,
185 S.W. 556, 560 (1916) (recognizing that legislature cannot deny citizens access to courts
as guaranteed by Article I, § 13 of Texas Constitution).
157. See LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 340-41 (Tex. 1986) (discussing court's
commitment to open courts provision, which assures constitutional guarantees of open
courts and due process of law).
158. See TEX. CONsT. art. I, § 13 (stating that "[aIll courts shall be open.., and every
person ... shall have remedy by due course of law") (emphasis added).
159. See LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 339 (discussing difference between mandatory, all-
inclusive language found in Article I, § 13 and qualifying language found in other sections
of Texas Constitution).
160. See, e.g., Texas Ass'n of Business v. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 450 (Tex.
1993) (holding that statute authorizing agency to assess fines and require deposit or bond
on fines prior to party seeking judicial review violates open courts provision because stat-
ute unreasonably restricts access to courts by mandating forfeiture of judicial review if
party does not pay deposit or bond); Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Tex.
1988) (holding that statutory limitation on medical malpractice damages violates open
courts provision by denying redress for injuries without adequate substitute); LeCroy, 713
S.W.2d at 342 (holding unconstitutional court filing fees that fund general state revenue
and not judiciary specifically); Waites v. Sondock, 561 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. 1977) (holding
that statute requiring mandatory continuances in cases involving legislators violates open
courts provision if party opposing continuance faces irreparable harm from delay in enforc-
ing existing rights because adequate remedy may not be available at later date); Eustis v.
City of Henrietta, 90 Tex. 468, 473, 39 S.W. 567, 568-69 (1897) (holding that statute requir-
ing payment of taxes as condition for defending against city's taking of property at tax sale
violated open courts provision by denying right to defend title to property); Dillingham v.
Putnam, 109 Tex. 1, 4-5, 14 S.W. 303, 304-05 (1890) (holding that statute requiring de-
feated receivers who are parties to litigation to post bond for full amount of judgment prior
to appeal violates open courts provision because it denies receivers same access to judicial
relief as other parties).
161. 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).
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statute of limitations because it severely curtailed the well-estab-
lished common-law right of a minor, upon reaching majority, to sue
for injuries resulting from another's negligence.162 The Sax court
concluded that the legislature may abolish or modify a common-
law right only if it concurrently provides an "adequate substitute"
or "reasonable alternative."'1 63
The Sax case is instructive in the context of Article 11.071 in two
important ways. First, for purposes of the open courts guarantee, a
statute of limitations narrowing the time for a minor to file suit
based on a common-law cause of action is surely not as offensive as
a statute limiting a death-row inmate's constitutionally guaranteed
habeas corpus right of redress. Second, because the writ of habeas
corpus is also a substantial common-law right, the legislature may
not modify or abridge it without providing an adequate substitute.
The Texas Legislature overstepped these bounds in enacting Arti-
cle 11.071.
When the legislature enacted Article 11.071, thereby basically
creating two simultaneous appeals, it eviscerated the underlying
liberty right of habeas corpus. This result obtains because the crea-
tion of two simultaneous appeals naturally renders one of them
meaningless. By the structure of Article 11.071, habeas corpus is
the appeal rendered meaningless even though it has historically
been a critical means of securing postconviction relief. More im-°
portantly, Article 11.071 offers no reasonable substitute or alterna-
tive. Indeed, because habeas corpus is a constitutional guarantee
of supreme importance, there can in fact be no adequate alterna-
tive. Thus, the Texas Legislature has virtually abolished the com-
mon-law right of habeas corpus without providing an adequate
substitute, thereby violating the Texas open courts guarantee and
the due course of law doctrine.
There has been limited legislative activity in other states narrow-
ing the time frame within which an applicant may seek a writ of
habeas corpus. 64 Currier v. Holden,16 5 a Utah case striking down a
162. Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 666-67.
163. Id at 667.
164. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 27-2719 (1987) (stating that habeas petition must be
filed within 42 days of death sentence); IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.3 (1994) (establishing
three-year statute of limitations for postconviction relief); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-39-5(2)
(Supp. 1995) (noting postconviction relief must be filed within three years after ruling
made on direct appeal); In re Harris, 855 P.2d 391, 397 (Cal. 1993) (holding that writs of
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statute similar to Article 11.071, is the most reasoned opinion on
this type of legislation, and may provide guidance for Texas
courts. 166 In Currier, a Utah court considered legislation limiting
the time period in which to apply for habeas corpus relief to no
later than three months from the date the trial court denies the
motion for new trial. 167 The court declared the statute unconsti-
tutional, relying upon the open courts provision of the Utah Con-
stitution.1 68  Reasoning that habeas corpus is "an important
constitutionally based personal right,'1 69 the court found that the
rigid three-month limitation on habeas corpus "did not achieve any
legitimate statutory objective by a reasonable means" and deprived
individuals of a constitutional remedy.170
The Utah Supreme Court, like the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals, has demonstrated great respect for the habeas corpus right,
and has referred to the writ as a "precious safeguard of personal
liberty" and a "procedure for assuring that [an individual] is not
deprived of life or liberty in derogation of a constitutional right.' 17'
The Utah court's protection of the habeas corpus right illustrates a
prime function of the writ, namely, to provide a means to collater-
ally attack convictions that are so constitutionally flawed that they
result in fundamental unfairness.' 72 Article 11.071, like the Utah
habeas corpus must be filed within reasonable time period, and if delayed, with adequate
explanation).
165. 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah App. 1993), cert. denied, 870 P.2d 957 (Utah 1994).
166. See Currier, 862 P.2d at 1360 (outlining petitioner's claims in challenging consti-
tutionality of statute of limitations governing habeas corpus relief). The petitioner in Cur-
rier argued that the statute undermined the extreme importance of the writ, violated the
due course of law provision of the Utah Constitution, and was inherently ambiguous. Id.
167. See id. at 1360-61 (noting that because statute imposes specific time restrictions
in which to file lawsuit after violation of legal right, it acts as statute of limitations).
168. Id. at 1372. The Utah open courts provision reads in part:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course of law, which shall be ad-
ministered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting of defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any
civil cause to which he is a party.
UTAH CONsT. art. I, § 11.
169. Currier, 862 P.2d at 1365.
170. Id. at 1372. The court noted that the legislature did not display a legitimate gov-
ernmental objective that warranted keeping a person in prison simply because of a missed
deadline. Id.
171. Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1034 (Utah 1989).
172. See id. at 1034-35 (noting that constitutional guarantees of liberty are more
highly valued than policy favoring finality of judgments).
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statute, creates an artificial procedural barrier to an accused's fun-
damental right to petition the courts to determine the constitution-
ality of a conviction and death sentence. Thus, just as the Utah
statute offended the Utah open courts provision, Article 11.071
runs afoul of the Texas due course of law doctrine.
C. Article I, Section 3: Equal Rights
Article 11.071 may also violate the equal rights guarantee of the
Texas Constitution'73 by abridging the habeas corpus and due
course of law rights of only the sub-class of criminals who have
been sentenced to death. The equal rights guarantee of the Texas
Constitution dates back to the 1836 Constitution of the Republic of
Texas, which predates the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution by thirty-two years. 174
Contained in Section 3 of the Texas Bill of Rights, the equal rights
guarantee includes an affirmative grant of a right to equality along
with its negative prohibition on the abridgement of equal rights. 75
Texas has developed its own test to determine if a statute
abridges the equal rights guarantee. 76 Under this test, Texas
courts will first determine if the purpose of the statute is valid, and
then determine if the classifications drawn by that statute are ra-
tionally related to the statute's purpose. 177 This test requires that
similarly situated individuals be treated equally under a statutory
class unless there is a rational basis for not doing So.178 Although
this test sounds like the low-level scrutiny test used in the federal
173. TEX. CONsT. art. I, § 3. The provision states: "All free men, when they form a
social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive sepa-
rate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Id.
174. See Constitution of the Republic of Texas, Declaration of Rights (1836) (stating
that "[a]ll men ... have equal rights"), reprinted in TEX. CONST. app. 493, 493 (Vernon
1993).
175. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3; see Arvel (Rod) Ponton III, Sources of Liberty in the
Texas Bill of Rights, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 93, 98 (1988) (explaining that use of affirmative
language in Texas Bill of Rights was deliberate attempt to convey greater liberties and
protections to individuals),
176. See Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194, 196-97 (Tex. 1985) (rejecting defend-
ant's invitation to apply federal equal protection standard because Texas has adopted its
own standard, which is at least as protective as federal constitutional standards).
177. Whitworth, 699 S.W.2d at 197.
178. Id.
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equal protection analysis, the Texas test is somewhat more strin-
gent in application. 17 9
An application of this test to Article 11.071 reveals that Texas's
new habeas corpus law likely violates the equal rights guarantee of
the Texas Constitution. The first prong of the Texas equal rights
test calls for a determination of whether there is a legitimate state
purpose behind the challenged statute. 80 Article 11.071 became
law because of legislative concern over the abuse of habeas corpus
by death-row inmates and the substantial burden on the state cof-
fers for capital appeals in state and federal courts. In essence, the
purpose of the statute was budgetary in nature.'8'
The financial justifications offered for Article 11.071 do not sat-
isfy the requisite legitimate governmental interest. Although budg-
etary concerns, in many instances, may represent a legitimate
governmental interest, these concerns should not be a factor in the
habeas corpus analysis. As previously stated, the framers directed
that habeas relief be speedy and effectual for the writ applicant, not
the government, and the framers considered the writ of habeas
corpus an inviolable right never to be suspended by the legisla-
ture.' 2 The framers did not contemplate legislative restriction of
habeas corpus relief designed to further legislators' own agendas;
rather, they specifically provided that the writ be absolute in na-
ture. Even assuming, however, that it is appropriate, let alone
moral, to apply a type of cost-benefit analysis to carrying out the
death sentence in the face of possible error, the overall cost to the
government to confine a prisoner for life-approximately $18,750
a year-is significantly less than the cost of pursuing an execu-
179. See HL Farm Corp. v. Self, 877 S.W.2d 288, 294 (Tex. 1994) (Doggett, J., dissent-
ing) (commenting on "how much less deferential the Texas test is than its federal counter-
part"); Reuters Am., Inc. v. Sharp, 889 S.W.2d 646, 656 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ
denied) (recognizing distinction between federal and Texas tests).
180. Whitworth, 699 S.W.2d at 197.
181. Another state interest likely to be advanced in support of Article 11.071 is that
the length of time between sentencing and execution diminishes any deterrent effect of
death sentences. However, there is no scientific data to support the argument that capital
punishment has any deterrent effect. See Robert M. Morgenthau, What Prosecutors Won't
Tell You, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1995, at A25 (reporting that over 100 years of experimenta-
tion has not produced any credible evidence that capital punishment deters crime).




tion, 83 and nothing in the legislative record of Article 11.071 indi-
cates that the new procedure will reduce the cost of executions
substantially, if much at all. Therefore, the financial justifications
for Article 11.071 under the first prong of the test are weak.
The second prong of the Texas equal rights test asks if the classi-
fication drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest.1 Even if Article 11.071 furthers some legitimate
state interest, the statute fails the second prong because it unrea-
sonably creates a sub-class within a class of convicted felons and
adversely affects only that class by abridging their habeas corpus
right. The Texas Supreme Court has held that Article I, Section 3
of the Texas Bill of Rights "was designed to prevent any person, or
class or persons, from being singled out as a special subject for dis-
crimination or hostile legislation. 1 85 Texas case law is hostile to
special class legislation such as Article 11.071.186
Further, Texas case law teaches that a statute will not survive the
second prong equal rights test if it creates an unreasonable or ir-
rebuttable presumption. 87 Inasmuch as Article 11.071 constricts
only the fundamental habeas corpus right of those sentenced to
death, the statute necessarily carries with it an impermissible, ir-
rebuttable presumption that all death-row inmates are guilty as
convicted, or at least deserving of much less constitutional protec-
tion than those convicted of misdemeanors or noncapital felonies.
The new law provides a very narrow window of opportunity for a
death-row inmate to seek habeas corpus relief from a wrongful
conviction or death sentence. In fact, the window is nearly closed.
For these reasons, Article 11.071 appears to violate the equal rights
guarantee of the Texas Constitution.
183. See Christy Hoppe, Executions Cost Texas Millions, Study Finds It's Cheaper to
Jail Killers for Life, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 8, 1992, at Al (citing study which
found that it costs $750,000 to imprison inmate for 40 years, versus $2.3 million to execute
inmate).
184. Whitworth, 699 S.W.2d at 197.
185. Burroughs v. Lyles, 142 Tex. 704, 711, 181 S.W.2d 570, 574 (1944).
186. See Waites v. Sondock, 561 S.W.2d 772, 775-76 (Tex. 1977) (striking down statute
that effectively foreclosed judicial remedy for divorced parents seeking child support).
187. Whitworth, 699 S.W.2d at 197.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Article 11.071 violates the Texas Bill of Rights' habeas corpus
guarantee because it abridges the absolute nature of the right, and
renders the remedy ineffectual. Likewise, Article 11.071 deprives a
death-row inmate of state constitutional due course of law because
it reduces access to the legal system in violation of the Texas open
courts provision. Finally, Article 11.071 offends state equal rights
protections because it creates a discrete class of convicted persons
with less entitlement to the writ, even though those persons have a
greater interest in that fundamental right with their lives on the
line.
In addition to running afoul of the language, intent, and purpose
of these Texas constitutional guarantees, Article 11.071 eliminates
procedural protections designed to guard against the execution of
innocent persons. Essentially, the new law places Texans in the
morally untenable position of sanctioning the death of these inno-
cent persons. 88 As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor correctly noted:
"[T]he execution of a legally and factually innocent person would
be a constitutionally intolerable event."'' i 9
Clothed with political jeopardy, the issue of Article 11.071's con-
stitutionality will reach the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The
court, as guardian of citizens' individual rights, will be called upon
to resolve this issue in a manner consistent with Texas's own
unique constitutional history. When the time comes, the court
should consider the 74th Legislature's purpose in enacting Article
11.071-to lessen the burden of the state's death penalty system on
the treasury and judiciary-and recognize that a cost-effective cap-
ital punishment scheme may compromise the liberty rights that the
framers held sacred. The courts of Texas should embrace their
duty to protect the constitution and forbid the legislature from pur-
suing a politically popular agenda at the expense of the fundamen-
tal rights of certain citizens. By limiting access to the Great Writ,
the Texas Legislature has engaged in the very governmental abuses
that the framers and ratifiers of the Texas Bill of Rights sought to
prevent.
188. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (stating that because
death is different from life imprisonment, there must be even greater scrutiny and strict
adherence to due process before execution); see also Tara L. Swafford, Responding to Her-
rera v. Collins: Ensuring That Innocents Are Not Executed, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 603,
618-22 (1995) (discussing reality that innocent persons are executed).
189. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 870 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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